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Current theoretical and empirical work in economics is oc-
casioning a major reappraisal of the causes and consequences
of alternative organizations of economic activity., In particular,
it is casting new light on the nature and role of both private
and public business enterprises.
Within traditional economic theory, the ,behavior of the
firm always has played a crucial role in determining the price
and quantity of goods produced. The existence of the firm,
however, typically has been taken for granted.2 Indeed, within
the world usually postulated in theoretical treatises-a world of
zero information and transaction costs with fully allocated, pri-
vately held rights to the use of resources-firms would not ex-
ist.3 Instead, each individual owning rights to the use of
* Professor of Economics, Law and Economics Center and Department
of Economics, University of Miami. The author gratefully acknowledges helpful
comments by David G. Davies and Robert J. Staaf.
1. The most important theoretical contributions to date include Alchian &
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Finn, 88 J.
POL. EcoN. 288 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976);
Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Williamson, Trans-
action-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. &
EcoN. 233 (1979); Alchian, Property Rights, Specialization, and the Firm (1981)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review); Barzel, The
Firm: A Coordinator of Contracts (1981) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at
the Minnesota Law Review); Oi, Heterogeneous Firms and the Organization of
Production (1981) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at the Minnesota Law Re-
view).
Much empirical work also has been undertaken. For a critical review of the
literature, see generally De Alessi, The Economics ofProperty Rights: A Review
of the Evidence, 2 RESEARCH L. & EcoN. 1 (1980).
2. Intermediate and advanced textbooks in economic theory usually do
not even address the question of why firms exist. Alchian & Demsatz, supra
note 1, at 778. See, e.g., J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 52-
102 (1971).
3. For present purposes, the firm is defined as a coalition of resource own-
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resources (including one's own labor) would be an independ-
ent contractor, buying the rights to the use of inputs owned by
others, adding his or her own resources, and then selling the
rights to the use of the output.4
The traditional explanations for the existence of firms have
centered on the risk-bearing function of the entrepreneur, first
articulated by Knight in 1921,5 and on the cost of forming con-
tracts in the market, first advanced by Coase in 1937.6 But, at
best, risk aversion only explains why one individual does not
own all the assets within a productive organization. And the
recognition that contracting in the market is costly, although it
provides an important insight into the formation of firms, fails
to yield fully testable hypotheses. 7
Moreover, theorists only recently have begun to examine
the effects of government regulation on the behavior of pri-
vately owned business organizations and to explore the eco-
nomic consequences of public ownership.8 Indeed, much of the
literature on public enterprises still focuses on normative pre-
scriptions, addressing why certain types of firms should be gov-
ernment owned and how such firms should behave, rather than
why certain types of firms in fact are government owned and
ers engaged in a team production process in which one party is the centralized
contractual agent. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, at 778, 779-83.
4. This possibility is not as farfetched as it may seem. For example, when
the advent of electric power in England first led to the establishment of facto-
ries, it was iot uncommon for weavers to rent space on a factory's floor, install
their own equipment, buy yam on credit, and sell the cloth produced. See, e.g.,
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNomICA 386, 388 (1937). Similarly, the put-
ting-out system relied on contracts formed in the market rather than on the
"firm." See S. CLOUGH & C. COLE, EcoNOmic HISTORY OF EUROPE 177-85 (3d ed.
1946).
5. F. KNIGHT, RISI, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFrr (1921).
6. Coase, supra note 4, at 386.
7. For an elaboration of these comments, see Alchian & Demsetz, supra
note 1, at 783-85.
8. The seminal articles on the effects of government regulation are Alchi-
an & Kessel, Competition, Monopoly, and the Pursuit of Pecuniary Gain, in As-
PECTS OF LABOR EcoNoMIcs 157 (1962); Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm
Under Regulatory Constrain 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962); Stigler & Fried-
land, What Can the Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & EcoN.
1 (1962). See also Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior,
53 Am. EcoN. REV. 1032 (1963).
For a discussion of the consequences of government owneiship, see Alchi-
an, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 IL PoLnco 816 (1965); De Alessi, An
Economic Analysis of Government Ownership and Regulation: Theory and the
Evidence from the Electric Power Industry, 19 PuB. CHOICE 1 (1974). For a sum-
mary of the subsequent theoretical and empirical work, see generally De
Alessi; supra note 1.
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how such firms in fact do behave.9
In the early 1970's, Alchian and Demsetz suggested that pri-
vate business enterprises arise to solve the shirking-informa-
tion problem of team production.O The Alchian and Demsetz
approach has proven particularly useful" because it yields
testable hypotheses not only with regard to the decision to
form contractual coalitions, but also with regard to the choice
of a particular organizational form, such as sole proprietorship,
partnership, or corporation. Indeed, recent contributions sug-
gest that the traditional concept of the firm as an independent,
identifiable entity is too simplistic.12 In order to predict busi-
ness choices what matters is the set of constraints limiting the
range of contractual relations available to owners of rights to
the use of resources, and the nature of the contractual arrange-
ments characterizing a particular coalition of resources. The
distinction whether a particular set of contracts is within a
"firm" or among "firms" in many cases is irrelevant to predict-
ing its economic consequences.13
This Article summarizes and extends recent contributions
to the economic analysis of business choices. Part II summa-
rizes the analytical framework for predicting the nature and
structure of private business enterprises. Part I extends this
analytical framework to public business enterprises. Finally,
Part IV explores some of the economic consequences of private
versus public ownership.
H. THE NATURE OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES
Recent developments in economic theory suggest that posi-
tive transaction costs, broadly defined as the costs of acquiring
and using information as well as of negotiating, monitoring, and
enforcing contracts, are crucial in determining the choice of
contractual arrangement for organizing production.14 In con-
junction with a growing body of empirical evidence on the eco-
nomic consequences of alternative ownership structures, this
work is providing a more rigorous framework for assessing the
9. But see SCHmALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONoPOLIEs 85-99
(1979).
10. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, at 777-95.
11. See authorities cited supra note 1.
12. See, e.g., Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 1, at 326.
13. For example, in order to predict the economic consequences of the re-
serve clause in professional sports, it is immaterial whether the team or the
league is the "fim." See, e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, at 790-91 n.15.
14. See Williamson, supra note 1, at 245-46.
1982]
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behavior of privately owned, market-oriented business enter-
prises relative to other organizational forms, including govern-
ment-owned business enterprises.
Current theory suggests that private business enterprises
arise to solve the shirking-information problem of team produc-
tion.15 If the output produced by individuals working together
as a team is greater than the sum of the outputs that each indi-
vidual member of the team could produce separately (the pro-
duction function is not separable), individuals have an
incentive to engage in team production. If, however, the out-
put, or marginal product, attributable to each member of the
team is costly to measure, each team member has an incentive
to shirk, because each individual can enjoy the full benefit of
his or her own shirking while bearing only a pro-rata share of
the resulting costs. The problem, therefore, is how to measure
the productivity of the inputs and how to structure rewards in
order to discourage shirking, including shirking by the
monitors.
From this perspective, the privately owned firm is a set of
voluntary contractual arrangements among utility-maximizing
owners of rights to the use of resources. 16 The problem of who
will police the monitors is solved by forming a contract that as-
signs to the monitors the residual claim to the coalition's net
earnings, thereby providing monitors with an incentive to po-
lice themselves. The problem of who will be the monitors is
solved by assigning the residual claim to the owners of the as-
sets most specialized to the firm. These are the assets whose
value in the next-best use is considerably less than their value
in the present use. Thus, the free enterprise firm is a firm
where one party, or group of individuals, has the right to the
firm's residual, including the right to sell this residual claim, is
a party to all contracts with joint inputs, has the right to rene-
gotiate the contract of any input and to alter the composition of
the team, and has the right to observe the behavior of inputs.17
Competitive forces also inhibit shirking. Competition from
other enterprises with respect to product quality and price pro-
15. Shirking is broadly defined as the unanticipated failure to meet con-
tractual obligations. It includes opportunistic behavior by members of the
team as well as by other business enterprises. See Klein, Transaction Cost De-
terminants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, PAPERS & PROC. OF THE 92ND
ANNuAL MEETING OF THE Am. ECON. ASS'N, 70 Am. ECON. REV. 356, 356-57 (1980).
16. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, at 783; Klein, Crawford & Alchian,
supra note 1, at 326.
17. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, at 781-83.
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vides a check on performance, encourages the evolution of in-
ternal control devices, and ultimately eliminates higher-cost
producers.18 Competition in the capital market transfers own-
ership and control of specialized assets to those coalitions bet-
ter able to use them. Finally, competition for managerial and
other team positions from candidates within and outside the
coalition discourages shirking by employees.
The focus on contractual relations suggests that one impe-
tus to the organization of business enterprises is the desire to
reduce the possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behav-
ior. If a party to a contract commits resources in such a way
that their value in the next-best alternative use is greatly di-
minished, that party becomes open to opportunistic behavior
by the other parties to the contract. As a result, that party will
have the incentive either to own the assets outright or to allo-
cate resources to protect itself, perhaps through longer-term
and more detailed contracts. Because opportunistic behavior
raises the cost of contracting among business enterprises, a
good deal of vertical integration simply may be an effort to
lower the costs of doing business.19
Taking account of the possibility for opportunistic behav-
ior, therefore, yields predictions as to which assets a business
coalition is more likely to own and which it is more likely to
rent. Enterprises using computers, for example, are more
likely to own the computer tapes, which contain team-specific
information with little value in the next-best use, than the com-
puters, which could be reallocated elsewhere with little loss.
Similarly, banks may be expected to own rather than to rent
their bank vaults, and growers of agricultural products are
more likely to own the land on which the crop is grown, the
longer the crop's gestation period.20
This analytical approach also explains why particular
forms of business organization are chosen. If production
18. See generally De Alessi, Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Ef-
ficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory (1983) (unpublished paper) (on file at
the Minnesota Law Review) (effect of competitive forces on enterprise
efficiency).
19. See, e.g., Liebeler, Bureau of Competition: Antitrust Enforcement Activ-
ities, in THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION
AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR 65-97 (K. Clarkson & T. Muris eds. 1981).
20. The point is that longer-term contracts, of which ownership is a special
case, become relatively more attractive as the probability of opportunistic be-
havior increases rather than that long-term contracts are not a viable alterna-
tive to outright ownership. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, at 792; Klein,
Crawford & Alchian, supra note 1, at 302-04.
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processes encourage relatively large team sizes and monitoring
costs are relatively low, then employer-employee contracts will
evolve (e.g., sole proprietorship, corporation).21 In this context,
the economics of raising large sums of equity capital has fos-
tered the development of the modern corporation with transfer-
able shares. Shareholders own the specialized assets and bear
the value consequences of decisions made within the enter-
prise and changes in market conditions, while managers of the
corporation generally specialize in deciding how resources are
used and act as agents for the stockholders.22
Scholars currently are exploring, in increasing detail, the
implications of this view of the principal-agent relationship.23
For example, the existence of agency costs helps to explain the
appearance of organizations with autonomous profit centers
and conglomerates with wholly owned subsidiaries.24
Profit-sharing arrangements will evolve if team size can be
relatively Small and shirking is relatively costly to monitor.25
This hypothesis explains the existence of partnerships in pro-
fessional and intellectual work and share contracts in certain
agricultural and mining activities.26
Mutuals and nonprofit organizations (e.g., mutual savings
banks, churches, country clubs) will evolve if individuals desire
less responsiveness to market incentives and more of certain
kinds of "shirking."27 These organizational forms do not en-
courage the capitalization of future consequences into current
transfer prices, thus reducing the ability of any one group
within the coalition to fully capture the gains from improved
management, as judged by market standards.
The existence of transaction costs also affects the choice of
technology. Other things being equal, transaction costs create
an incentive to develop and adopt production processes which,
21. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, at 785-91.
22. The issue of separation of ownership and management popularized in
A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)
(study of corporations viewed as political institutions), lacks theoretical justifi-
cation and empirical support. See De Alessi, Private Property and Dispersion
of Ownership in Large Corporations, 28 J. FN. 839, 849 (1973).
For a thorough discussion of the corporate form, see Williamson, The Mod-.
era Corporation" Origin, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LIT. 1537 (1981).
23. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 308-09; Alchian, supra
note 1.
24. See Williamson, supra note 22, at 1557-60.
25. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, at 785-86.
26. Id. at 786-87.
27. Id. at 790.
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although costlier in other dimensions, sufficiently lower the
cost of monitoring shirking.
The structure of property rights similarly affects the choice
of technology and the variability of inputs. If private rights to
the use of resources are weak, managers and other deci-
sionmakers will have more opportunity to increase their own
welfare at the expense of both the owners of the specialized as-
sets and the taxpayers. Managers will have less incentive to
minimize costs, yielding greater variations among enterprises
in input proportions and in the choice of production
techniques.
The analysis presented thus far clearly identifies variables
that affect the characteristics of the coalition. As additional
transactions are brought within the coalition, the costs of moni-
toring and coordinating production eventually will exceed the
benefits, setting a limit to the size of the coalition. Moreover,
differences in the availability and qualtity of entrepreneurial
ability, including the ability to monitor, and differences in own-
ership arrangements imply the existence of enterprises differ-
ing in size, technology used, range and quality of output
produced, and other characteristics. Thus, transaction costs
help to explain the heterogeneity of firms within each
industry.28
Focusing on transaction costs and the structure of property
rights is yielding insights regarding not only why business co-
alitions are formed, but also why different forms of business or-
ganizations are chosen in different circumstances.2 9 Work on
the evolution and economic consequences of different systems
of property rights is casting further light on these issues, thus
paving the way for a more rigorous analysis of the nature and
role of public enterprises.
It clearly is useful to be able to predict the circumstances
under which enterprises arise, the choice of the particular form
of business organization, and the economic consequences that
flow from alternative organizational forms. In many cases,
however, it would be misleading to focus wholly on the enter-
prise as the basic unit of analysis. For a broader range of pur-
poses, including the analysis of collusive arrangements and the
whole range of government business policies, it is far more use-
ful to examine the goals and consequences of the alternative
contractual arrangements used to coordinate business activi-
28. SeeWiliamson, supra note 22, at 1544; Oi, supra note 1.
29. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
1982]
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ties, and disregard whether the relations are within a team or
among teams.
The theoretical approach described in this Article also of-
fers a new perspective on a broad range of government policies.
In particular, it suggests that many business practices, attacked
as anti-competitive under various antitrust programs, may be
undertaken to protect enterprises from opportunistic behavior,
thereby lowering production costs (e.g., by reducing monitoring
costs through vertical integration) and enhancing competition.
This new view of antitrust is shared by a growing number of
economists and legal scholars. 30
I. THE NATURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
The reasons for government ownership of business enter-
prises are not well understood. Such reasons, however, are not
separate from the reasons government itself exists and grows,
phenomena which also have no generally accepted explana-
tion.3 1 This is not to say that such things as the movement
from anarchy to some kind of government are not predictable. 32
Rather, the processes whereby particular forms of government
arise and grow are not sufficiently well understood to permit
accurate predictions.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to focus on why some
business choices are solved through the political process, while
other business choices are solved through the market. The
question, therefore, is how to predict when political organiza-
tions will be used to make business choices. Several hypothe-
ses, not mutually exclusive, are discussed below and should
offer some insights.
One hypothesis is taste. To the extent that the nature of
the economic system under which an individual lives is itself a
source of utility, some individuals may prefer government to
private ownership of certain enterprises. Thus, some individu-
als would be willing to have less of other sources of utility (e.g.,
less food, clothing, and hospital services) in order to have more
30. See, e.g., 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKET AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND AN-
TITRUST IMPLICATIONS 83-89 (1975); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 1, at
298-302; Williamson, supra note 22.
31. See, e.g., BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS: THE SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT
GROWTH (T. Borcherding ed. 1977).
32. See, e.g., Bush, Individual Welfare in Anarchy, in EXPLORATIONS iN THE
THEORY OF ANARCHY 5 (G. Tullock ed. 1972); Stubblebine, On Property Rights
and Institutions in id. at 39.
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government ownership of the business enterprises producing
these or other goods and services.
Although taste may explain some instances of government
ownership of business enterprises, it is unlikely to be a major
explanation. Reason and evidence suggest that preference for
one ownership arrangement over another generally rests on the
belief that the behavior of the organizations differs. Thus, pref-
erence relates to perceived differences in outcomes rather than
to the utility of the ownership form per se. For example, one
can predict the political choice of whether a public transit sys-
tem is to be privately or municipally owned on the basis of ex-
pected differences in such things as funding (e.g., user fees or
general tax revenue) and the quality of the service provided,
without taking into account possible differences in taste regard-
ing ownership structure.33
A second hypothesis involves wealth redistribution.34 Indi-
viduals with a comparative advantage in the use of political
power have an incentive to use the state to redistribute re-
sources toward themselves. At the same time, politicians have
an incentive to provide services to buy political support. Under
these conditions, government ownership may be used partly to
mask wealth transfer. Indeed, there is some evidence to sup-
port this hypothesis. For example, Pashigian found that the
conversion of urban transit systems from private to public own-
ership occurred earlier in those cities in which users had
greater voting strength.35 Detailed analysis of the factors influ-
encing the probability of conversion from private to public con-
trol indicates that nonusers support profitable transit
operations and oppose policies which result in higher taxes and
public subsidies.36
A related hypothesis suggests that government ownership
is encouraged by the desire of some members of the public and
of some politicians to use the power of the state to modify be-
havior.3 7 Under this variant of the wealth-transfer hypothesis,
redistribution is a means rather than an end. The desired in-
centive structure, however, presumably could be organized
33. See Pashigian, Consequences and Causes of Public Ownership of Urban
Transit Facilities, 84 J. PoL. ECON. 1239, 1256-57 (1976).
34. Buchanan and Tullock have made extensive contributions to this and
related areas. See, e.g., J. BucHANAN, 1 TOT.SON & G. TuLLocK, TOWARD A
THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SocrETY (1980).
35. Pashigian, supra note 33, at 1241.
36. Pashigian, supra note 33, at 1255-57.
37. For example, the public ownership of electric utilities could facilitate
rate setting designed to reduce the use of energy.
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through other means, such as direct grants. As a result, the
choice of government ownership of business organizations as
an instrument of social policy must rest either on the lower
cost of this alternative or on the desire to mask the actual
wealth transfer, rather than on the desirability of the ends be-
ing sought.
A third hypothesis relates to the costs of transacting for,
establishing, and enforcing private property rights. One impli-
cation of these costs is that certain goods and services, (e.g.,
clean air) may not be produced at all, or may be produced in
smaller quantities. The provision of public goods supplies an
example. Public goods are goods, such as radio or television
signals, whose consumption by one individual does not detract
from anyone else's consumption. If the costs of excluding
nonpayers are high enough, some public goods will not be pri-
vately produced, or will not be produced in sufficient quanti-
ties, even though consumers would be willing to pay for them.38
Accordingly, one can argue that government should produce
the service and then tax users.
Such an argument, however, can at best be used to support
government provision of the goods at issue. Because the gov-
ernment typically has the option to contract with private enter-
prises for the production of the goods, government ownership
of such business enterprises is not necessary. Thus, the argu-
ment that the costs of transacting or of establishing private
property rights are sufficiently high to rule out the production
of certain goods by private business enterprises does not ex-
plain their production by government. And this point applies
whether or not the goods at issue are public, in the sense used
above.39
On the other hand, the weakening of private property
rights within government increases the difficulty of drafting a
contract specific enough to permit meaningful monitoring,
38. For a useful exchange on the nature and policy implications of public
goods, compare Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods, 7
J.L. & EcoN. 71, 71-80 (1964) (addressing the problem of what goods to produce
as well as how to distribute them) with Samuelson, Public Goods and Sub-
scription TV- Correction of the Record, 7 J.L. & ECON. 81, 81-83 (1964) (focusing
on the Pareto-optimal conditions relating to the distribution of commodities
once they are produced). See also J. BUcHANAN, TuE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF
PUBLIC GOODS (1968); Staaf & West, Limits on Public Provision of Private
Goods, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 461 (1980).
39. The literature on the behavior of bureaucrats, defined as deci-
sionmakers within large organizations, is extensive. The seminal contributions
include W. NisKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATivE GovRNMENT (1971);
G. TuLLocx, THE PoLrIcs oF BUREAUCRACY (1965).
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thereby encouraging production within government. 40 For ex-
ample, such terms as "in the public good" and "in the public in-
terest," frequently used in legislation, simply are not specific
enough to define the rights of taxpayers and the duties of bu-
reaucrats, effectively ruling out enforcement of contracts in
which they appear.
The extension of the framework developed earlier in the
context of privately owned business enterprises suggests that
some government ownership of business enterprises also oc-
curs to solve the shirking-information problem of team produc-
tion. As previously noted, government can contract with
private enterprises to produce the goods desired. As the cost of
monitoring whether output meets contract specifications in-
creases relative to the cost of monitoring inputs when produc-
tion is vertically integrated, however, the opportunities for
shirking and the difficulty of drawing enforceable contracts also
increase. As a result, government decisionmakers have the in-
centive to organize government owned business enterprises.
For example, it is relatively inexpensive to determine
whether such physical entities as a tank, a missile, an airplane,
a ship, a rifle, a pair of trousers, or a bedsheet meet the specifi-
cations provided in a procurement contract. Holding other vari-
ables constant, therefore, the analysis suggests that
government representatives will contract to purchase such
goods from private enterprises. As the cost of monitoring some
of the desired output characteristics increases, the analysis im-
plies that the contract will allow the buyer to place its own
monitors to check performance along the production process.
Such arrangements in fact are a common feature of govern-
ment procurement contracts for relatively complex outputs,
such as missiles and ships, but are not observed in the case of
more readily checked entities such as trousers and bedsheets.
As the cost of monitoring outputs relative to inputs contin-
ues to increase, the extent of vertical integration within the
government also will increase. For example, assuming such
contracts could be drawn, in most cases it would be prohibi-
tively expensive to determine the extent to which such com-
modities as the level of defense and the adroitness of foreign
policy met contract specifications. As a result, such contracts
formed in the market would provide an increased range of
shirking, including opportunistic behavior. If defense or foreign
policy were provided by private contractors, the latter would
40. See W. NisxANEN supra note 39, at 20.
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have an incentive to increase their wealth at the expense of
taxpayers by appropriating assets, including simply taking over
the country. As the cost of reducing the range for such oppor-
tunistic behavior increases, more of these activities will be ver-
tically integrated within government.4 1 Note, however, that
competing governments in a federal system can still be used to
provide a check.The tax structure also affects the choice of the particular
business forms used to organize economic activity. For exam-
ple, exempting state enterprises from property and certain
other taxes lowers their production outlays relative to those of
private firms and redistributes wealth from taxpayers to cus-
tomers of the privileged firms. In addition, taxing the net in-
come of private business enterprises lowers the returns to
monitoring, weakening the property rights of the owners of the
specialized assets and thus increasing the managers' opportu-
nities for discretionary behavior.
The above discussion suggests two main explanations for
government ownership of business enterprises: to redistribute
wealth and to solve the shirking-information problem of team
production.42 The actual or fancied reasons for the establish-
ment of government enterprises, however, will affect behavior
only to the extent that they are reflected in binding constraints
on the enterprises' decisionmakers. Thus, in order to predict
behavior, it is necessary to disregard the rhetoric and focus on
the cost-reward structures embedded in the particular organi-
zational forms under consideration. 43 Part IV will illuminate
these issues further by examining some of the economic conse-
quences of government versus private ownership of business
enterprises.
41. For example, from the 1200's to the 1500's Swiss, German and other
mercenaries specialized in providing military defense. As the size of the polit-
ical entities increased and as defense became progressively more complex and
sophisticated, monitoring costs increased and national armies replaced the
mercenaries. A. VAGTS, ISTORY OF ILITARISM 41-49 (1937); J. VERBRUGGEN,
ART OF WARFARE IN WESTERN EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 117-25 (1977).
42. Careful consideration suggests that other explanations, such as the de-
sire to provide a check on the performance of private enterprise, essentially are
variants of the hypotheses already discussed or mere rhetorical noise.
43. The extent to which the desire to establish various forms of political
enterprises is implemented depends upon the nature of the constitution which
constrains the political process. This topic will not be pursued here.
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IV. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC
RELATIVE TO PRIVATE ENTERPRISES
A. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Before examining the economic consequences of the effec-
tive constraints on decisionmakers within private and public
business enterprises, it is useful to summarize the theoretical
framework to be used. 44
Briefly, all individuals are hypothesized to maximize their
welfare (utility) subject to the limits on their choices. 45 At the
margin all sources of utility (goods) are substitutable and indi-
viduals will adjust their consumption of each good until the
rate at which each individual is willing to substitute one good
for another is just equal to the rate at which he or she is able to
do so. Among other things, this process implies that individu-
als respond to a change in circumstances by choosing relatively
more of those goods which have become relatively cheaper; de-
mand curves are negatively sloped.
In order to use the theory for predictive purposes, it is nec-
essary and sufficient to identify the variables that enter an indi-
vidual's utility function and to specify how changes in
circumstances affect their relative cost to the chooser. The na-
ture of these variables has been thoroughly explored in the
literature and is sufficiently established to make further discus-
sion unnecessary for present purposes.46 The nature of the
constraints, however, deserves closer investigation.
The contracts defining a particular organizational form
specify the nature of the rights which various members of the
coalition may hold to the use of resources, to the income the re-
sources generate, and to the transferability of those resources
44. For a general discussion of the theoretical framework herein adopted,
see generally De Alessi, supra note 1.
45. Technically, an individual is hypothesized to maximize a strictly con-
cave utility function subject to a strictly concave transformation function de-
fined over both pecuniary and nonpecuniary variables. These variables reflect
a variety of goals, such as health, security, prestige, and the welfare of others,
as well as the public welfare. Thus, an individual is selfish in the sense that the
right to make choices which affect his or her welfare is viewed as a good. See
De Alessi, Toward an Analysis of Post-Disaster Cooperation, 65 Am. EcoN. REV.
127, 128 (1975).
Note that, in economics, the term utility has no psychological connotations.
It is merely an index of choice, in exactly the same sense that centigrades are
an index of temperature. See A. ALCHrAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUC-
TION: COmPETriON, COORDINATION AND CONTROL 40 (1977).
For an excellent introduction to the concept of utility and to economic the-
ory and its application, see generally id.
46. See, e.g., A. AL.cmN & W. ALLEN, supra note 45, at 24-40.
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to other individuals. The system of property rights, or con-
straints, embedded in various alternative organizational forms
thus determines, through actual or imputed prices, how bene-
fits and harms resulting from a decision will be allocated be-
tween the decisionmaker and everyone else. The resulting
cost-reward structure will affect choices systematically.47
The term "private property rights" means that an individ-
ual's rights to the use of resources are exclusive and volunta-
rily transferable. The more carefully these rights are defined,
allocated, and enforced, the closer is the relationship between
the welfare of the individual and the benefits and harms flow-
ing from his or her decisions. As a result, the decisionaker
has greater incentive to take such economic, and social, effects
into account when making decisions affecting such property
rights. Indeed, with zero information and transaction costs
there are no external effects and individuals bear the full con-
sequences of their decisions.4 8 Moreover, the initial partition-
ing of the rights does not affect their subsequent use.49
In practice, of course, information and transaction costs are
positive. This encourages the organization of private business
enterprises to solve the shirking-information problem of team
production, and provides owners of the assets most specialized
to the coalition with an incentive to maximize the value of such
assets.5 0
47. Property rights may be partitioned, so that different individuals con-
currently may hold different rights to the use of a particular resource. For ex-
ample, the lease of a house assigns different rights to the lessee and to the
lessor regarding the use of the house. Moreover, other individuals may have
the right to fly over it, dump smoke on it, make noise near it, or cast a shadow
over it. Contract law deals explicitly with disagreements regarding the parti-
tioning of rights intended by the parties, whereas tort and nuisance laws ad-
dress conflicts arising when rights are partitioned and the exercise of rights by
one or more owners imposes harms on owners of other rights.
48. Full consequences include all future outcomes, which are fully capital-
ized. See De Alessi, Implications of Property Rights for Government Investment
Choices, 59 AM. EcoN. REv. 13, 16-20 (1969).
49. Resource rights will flow to their highest-value use, regardless of their
initial assignment. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L & EcoN. 1, 6 (1960).
50. To the extent that some individuals view participation in a business co-
alition as a source of utility in itself; they would be willing to accept a corre-
spondingly lower rate of pecuniary compensation. Thus, the owners of the
specialized assets might incur a smaller or even a negative rate of return on the
current market value of the capital invested, with the exhaustion of the individ-
uals' own wealth as the ultimate constraint.
Note, however, that as the opportunity cost of this source of utility in-
creases (e.g., as individuals are faced with increasing loss of wealth), individu-
als' investments in such a utility source would decrease. J. HENDERSON & R.
QuANDT, supra note 2, at 6-37.
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An increase in information and transaction costs, other
things being equal, will reduce the profitability of monitoring.
The enterprise will undertake less monitoring, and deci-
sionmakers within private organizations will have more oppor-
tunity to shirk and to increase their utility at the expense of
the owners of the coalition's specialized assets. As a result, the
behavior of the enterprise will stray further from that behavior
implied by the owners' wealth-maximization hypothesis.51
Government regulation of private enterprises, other things
being equal, will further reduce the profitability of monitoring
by weakening owners' property rights. This also implies ex-
panded managerial opportunity to shirk and increased devia-
tion of enterprise behavior from that behavior implied by the
owners' wealth-maximization hypothesis.52
Turning to public enterprises, their distinguishing charac-
teristic is the relatively high cost of transferring ownership
shares in their specialized assets. Taxpayers who wish to
change their portfolio of these shares typically must change the
political jurisdictions in which they work and live, or change
the operation of the political enterprises, both relatively costly
activities.5 3 Because property rights in the specialized assets of
political enterprises are effectively nontransferable, specializa-
tion in their ownership is ruled out. This inhibits the capitali-
zation of future consequences into current transfer prices and
reduces the incentive of owners to monitor managers.
In particular, one may expect that decisionmakers within
political enterprises will have weaker constraints on their
choices than the managers of regulated comparable private en-
terprises. Private enterprises are subject to the discipline of
the market and must respond to market signals to survive.
Managers of public firms, on the other hand, are less con-
51. In neoclassical economic theory, which still dominates much current
thinking, private business enterprises are viewed as strict wealth maximizers.
See J. HENDERSON & IL QuANDr, supra note 2, at 98-100.
52. The literature dealing with the economics of government regulation of
business is extensive. Important theoretical contributions include Demsetz,
Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. T. & EcoN. 55 (1968); Peltzman, Toward a More
General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGm.r. SCL 3 (1971); Telser, On the
Regulation ofIndustry: A Note, 77 J. POT. EcoN. 937 (1969). On the behavior of
regulators under alternative regulatory arrangements, see Eckert, On the Incen-
tives of Regulators: The Case of Taxicabs, 14 PuB. CHOICE 83 (1973). See also
authorities cited supra note 8.
53. See Alchian, supra note 1. But see Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Ex-
penditures, 64 J. Poi- EcoN. 416, 424 (1956). Federalism, of course, is designed
to lower the cost to individuals of revising their portfolio of government assets.
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strained by market considerations, and find it easier to obtain
subsidies and to mask utility-maximizing behavior under the
guise of fulfilling other social goals. Indeed, public enterprises,
especially those endowed with politically influential clients, can
survive for long time periods, and their managers prosper, even
in the presence of persistent losses.54 Depending upon the ex-
tent to which political firms meet the objectives assigned to
them, that may well be as it should.
B. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
The above analysis suggests that managers of political en-
terprises have greater opportunity for discretionary behavior
than managers of regulated and unregulated private enter-
prises. In particular, they have more opportunity to increase
the resources (e.g., staff, assets) under their supervision and to
allocate those resources in ways designed to enhance their own
welfare. Salary and other contractual pecuniary rewards of
government employees, however, usually are subject to statu-
tory ceilings, whereas those paid to managers of private enter-
prises are not so limited. This difference implies that
government employees have greater incentive to allocate re-
sources to enhance their job security, thereby increasing the
present value of all future job related pecuniary and nonpecu-
niary sources of utility. Future job related rewards, however,
are not capitalizable and human life is finite. Moreover, it is
costlier for owners to monitor the acquisition of nonpecuniary
rather than pecuniary sources of utility. These considerations
suggest that the cost of nonpecuniary sources is lower and
managers of political enterprises will acquire more of them.
The analysis further implies that managers of political en-
terprises are more likely to adopt policies that will ease their
work load and generally make their jobs more pleasant.55 For
example, they will choose pricing policies that are easier to ad-
minister. This strategy includes changing output prices less
frequently, tailoring them less closely to existing demand and
supply conditions, favoring vociferous special interest groups,
and giving subordinates across-the-board wage increases. Sim-
ilarly, they will be more likely to hire subordinates with charac-
teristics they prefer, discriminating on the basis of race, sex,
education, and congeniality, and giving such subordinates ben-
efits designed to reduce friction. As a result of these and simi-
54. See De Alessi, upra note 8, at 7.
55. See W. NisKANEN, supra note 39, at 38; De Alessi, supra note 1, at 41.
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lar activities, political enterprises typically will incur higher
production costs and will be less efficient by market standards.
There is a good deal of evidence regarding the economic
consequences of government ownership of business enter-
prises. Compared to regulated private firms, for example, mu-
nicipal electric utilities generally charge lower prices,56 engage
in less wealth-maximizing price discrimination,5 7 including
fewer peak-related tariffs,5 8 favor business relative to residen-
tial users and voters to nonvoters,5 9 change prices less fre-
quently and in response to larger changes in economic
determinants, 60 relate prices less closely to the costs of serving
particular user groups, 61 sell wholesale electric power at lower
prices and buy it at higher prices, 62 spend more on plant con-
struction, have greater capacity and higher operating costs, 63
adopt cost-reducing innovations less readily,64 offer a smaller
variety of output,65 maintain managers in office longer,66 and
exhibit greater variation in rates of return.67
Evidence from other industries provides additional support
for several of these hypotheses and other implications of the
analysis presented above. Relative to regulated private enter-
prises, municipal water utilities have lower tariffs with fewer
service categories and fewer blocks within each category, have
rate structures which favor more politically active groups, use
56. The price differential, however, seems largely accounted for by differ-
ential tax treatment. See Peltzman, Pricing in Public and Private Enterprises:
Electric Utilities in the United States, 14 J. & EcoN. 109, 125 (1971).
57. Id. at 117.
58. De Alessi, Ownership and Peak-Load Pricing in the Electric Power In-
dustry, 17 Q. REv. EcoN. & Bus. 7, 15 (1977).
59. Peltzman, supra note 56, at 114.
60. Id. at 122.
61. Id. at 118. See also Jackson, Regulation and Electric Utility Rate
Levels, 45 LAND EcoN. 372, 376 (1969); Mann & Mikesell, Tax Payments and
Electric Utility Prices, 38 S. EcoN. J. 69, 77-78 (1971); Mann & Seifried, Pricing in
the Case of Publicly-Owned Electric Utilities, 12 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 77, 87
(1972).
62. De Alessi, Some Effects of Ownership on the Wholesale Prices of Elec-
tric Power, 13 EcoN. INQUIRY 526, 537 (1975).
63. Moore, The Effectiveness of Regulation of Electric Utility Prices, 36 S.
EcoN. J. 365, 373 (1970).
64. Tilton, The Nature of Firm Ownership and the Adoption of Innovations
in the Electric Power Industry (1973) (unpublished paper) (on file at the Min-
nesota Law Review).
65. Peltzman, supra note 56, at 118.
66. De Alessi, Managerial Tenure Under Private and Government Owner-
ship in the Electric Power Industry, 82 J. Poi EcoN. 645, 652 (1974).
67. Shepherd, Utility Growth and Profits under Regulation, in UTH.=




more capital-intensive production techniques, and are gener-
ally less efficient by market standards.68 It also appears that,
compared with both regulated and unregulated private enter-
prises, political enterprises are less successful in satisfying
consumer wants for urban transit,69 are less efficient by market
standards in providing bank7O and airline services, 71 and incur
higher costs in providing fire prevention7 2 and refuse collection
services.73 Moreover, evidence from the U.S. hospital industry
suggests that political enterprises have more binding and ex-
plicit internal monitoring rules,7 4 make less use of market in-
formation,75 are more likely to give across-the-board rather
than selective wage increases,7 6 are less likely to use cost-mini-
mizing input combinations, 77 are more likely to respond to an
increase in occupancy by increasing the proportion of adminis-
trative personnel at the expense of medical and other serv-
ices,7 8 are less efficient by market standards, 79 and emphasize
the production of those services more easily monitored by
trustees and legislators.8 0 The validity of the hypotheses dis-
cussed in this section also is supported by indirect evidence re-
lating to the economic consequences of government regulation
68. See Crain & Zardkoohi, A Test of the Property Rights Theory of the
Firm Water Utilities in the United States, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 395, 406 (1978);
Hansman, Urban Water Services Pricing- Public vs. Private Firms (1976) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation) (available at George Washington Univ., Washing-
ton, D.C., Dept. of Econ.).
69. Pashigian, supra note 33, at 1255.
70. Davies, Property Rights and Economic Behavior in Private and Govern-
ment Enterprises: The Case of Australia's Banking System, 3 RESEARCH L. &
EcoN. 111, 136 (1981).
71. Davies, The Efficiency of Public versus Private Firms: The Case of Aus-
tralia's Two Airlines, 14 J.L. & ECON. 149, 165 (1971).
72. Ahlbrandt, Efficiency in the Provision of Fire Services, 16 PuB. CHOICE
1, 14 (1973).
73. Bennett and Johnson, Public versus Private Provision of Collective
Goods and Services: Garbage Collection Revisited, 34 PuB. CHOICE 55, 62-63
(1979); Savas, Policy Analysis for Local Government: Public vs. Private Refuse
Collection, 3 PoL'Y ANALYsis 49, 65 (1977).
74. Clarkson, Some Implications of Property Rights in Hospital Manage-
men, 15 J.L. & ECON. 363, 365 (1972).
75. Id. at 368.
76. Id. at 377.
77. Id. at 379.
78. Rushing, Differences in Profit and Nonprofit Organizations: A Study of
Effectiveness and Efficiency in General Short-Stay Hospitals, 19 AD. Sc. Q. 474,
479 (1974).
79. Id. at 483.




of private enterprises. 8X
V. CONCLUSION
A number of central arguments are presented in this Arti-
cle. First, private business enterprises arise to solve the shirk-
ing-information problem of team production. Transaction costs
also affect the specific choice of business organization. Second,
public business enterprises also arise to solve the shirking-in-
formation problem of team production, (e.g., difficulty of draw-
ing enforceable contracts), as well as to facilitate the
redistribution of wealth. Third, management of business enter-
prises by government employees weakens individuals' private
property rights to the use of resources. As a result, the behav-
ior of public enterprises differs systematically and predictably
from that of private enterprises, with the latter category typi-
cally observed as more efficient by market standards. Such an
observation, however, is neutral with respect to the desirability
of these two alternative ownership forms. To make that judg-
ment, it is necessary to know how well each organizational
form achieves its objectives relative to the next best
alternative.
The extensions of current economic theory described in
this Article are tentative. Although the evidence thus far sup-
ports them, more rigorous tests applied to a broader spectrum
of business activities clearly are necessary. The theoretical and
empirical work to date, however, provides a solid foundation for
further research as well as for more informed decisionmaking
in the courtroom and in government.
81. For a detailed review of this and related evidence, see generally De
Alessi, supra note 1, De Alessi, supra note 8.
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